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Editorial

IT is not only to his former pupils that the appearance of a new book on the Gospels by Dr R. H. Lightfoot is an event as exciting as it is rare. The excitement does not arise from an anticipation that a reckoning will now have to be made with revolutionary theories or startling speculations, flamboyantly canvassed. Far from it. Dr Lightfoot is the most reticent and cautious of our New Testament scholars. Reading *The Gospel Message of St Mark*[1] is like listening to the whisper of fascinating secrets, not at all to that blatant laying down of the law of which the higher critics are often accused. It is exciting, too, to find that Dr Lightfoot can occasionally forget himself and raise his voice to a moment of strident assertion, though even so it drops again before the sentence is ended. Thus on p. 52: "I must be allowed to say dogmatically that in the fourth gospel Judas is probably 'the man of sin', the 'anti-Christ'."

One knows that behind everything Dr Lightfoot writes there are years of patient reflection during which every detail has been attended to and all the evidences have been weighed with scrupulous honesty. He does what it is extremely difficult for anyone nowadays to do, not least for any theologian: he comes to the Gospels without presuppositions about what he is going to find in them, and so he genuinely lets them speak for themselves and shine in their own light. Moreover he has and communicates the conviction that they are terribly and mysteriously alive, and even verbally inspired in a sense other than the wooden one. No one has seen more clearly that to go to the Gospels—or simply to Mark and Q—for a biography of Jesus, or for that picture of the "Jesus of history" which the piety of fifty years ago discovered and delighted in, is to go for what they do not, and were never intended to, provide. On the other hand, no one has done more than Dr Lightfoot to help students to read the Gospels as they were read by those for whom they were originally written, and to find that so read they are the records of a weight of glory beyond all comparison. The words with which he concluded his Bampton Lectures (to the effect that for all their inestimable value the Gospels yield us little more than a whisper of the Lord's voice, and enable us to trace but the outskirts of his ways) have been widely and grossly misunderstood as though they were a confession of doubt, whereas of course they were really a confession of faith; it is to be hoped that the footnote on p. 103 of the present book will bring blushes to many cheeks and put an end to the obtuseness with which the passage has been quoted.

[1] Oxford University Press. 10s.

The Gospel Message of St Mark is a composite volume. It begins with a course of four lectures on St Mark's Gospel which were given at the University College of South Wales and Monmouthshire in October 1949. There follow two chapters on "The Cleansing of the Temple", which draw on some work by Professor Ernst Lohmeyer which is scarcely known here. In Chapter VII and in an appendix Dr Lightfoot returns to the question of the ending of St Mark's Gospel which he previously discussed in *Locality and Doctrine in the Gospels*, and in Chapter VIII he concludes with some wise reflections on "Form Criticism and the Study of the Gospels".

Dr Lightfoot is one of the few New Testament scholars in this country who upholds the view that St Mark's Gospel was intended to end at 16. 8. It is not for THEOLOGY to take sides in this dispute, but it is permissible to express the hope that it will be regarded as still an open question. The view that Mark was intended to end at 16. 8 has been described by eminent English scholars as "inconceivable" (F. C. Burkitt), "impossible" (A. H. McNeile), "intolerable" (H. G. Wood), "incredible" (C. H. Turner and A. W. F. Blunt). Whatever the truth may be, none of these pontifical epithets appears to be justly or accurately used, and they should not be allowed to convey the impression that only a crank can maintain the contrary. Here as at many other points Dr Lightfoot shows that strange conclusions, to which he finds himself led on critical grounds, bring into relief unheeded aspects of the Gospel of salvation and are important for the preacher as well as for the scholar.

Tent-makers

THE Archdeacon of Nottingham has written (THEOLOGY, July 1950) that for the saving of the parochial system "there can be no solution apart from the provision of sufficient full-time priests". That is axiomatic. The parochial system is our system, and it is fanciful to suppose that any other system can be effective as a basis for pastoral work in the Church of England.

Yet there is a widespread conviction that in the fairly near future the Church is likely to fail to provide a sufficiency of full-time priests. Some argue that that moment has already come. Few of those who have thought seriously about this problem believe that any other solution of the problem except the complete maintenance of the parochial system can be ideal. But the ideal is unobtainable, at least in the foreseeable future. Those who most strongly dislike the notion of "supplementary clergy", "part-time clergy"—by whichever of the various names, all unfortunate, we choose to call them—argue that the only answer is to maintain as many whole-time priests as finance and vocations and circumstances will allow. But face the facts. Already the old concept of a full-time clergy is becoming outmoded. Many of our clergy are no longer full-time pastors. Many of them are spending a fair proportion of their week in washing up,

cleaning rooms, supplementing their incomes by market-gardening. You cannot have a full-time clergy unless their economic status relieves them from the necessity of worrying about their homes and livelihood.

The alternatives often are not a full-time clergy or a part-time clergy. They are a clergy which spends part of its week in looking after itself with a struggle, or a clergy which earns its own livelihood in a secular occupation.

The full parochial system is the ideal. But the ideal cannot be realized.

In consequence various suggestions are put forward to cement the cracks in the parochial system. The different advocates of a part-time clergy at present begin with a number of different assumptions and motives:

(1) The parochial motive. Provide enough additional clergy to remedy the shortage, to ensure an adequate supply of the sacraments and pastoral ministrations.

(2) The economic motive. The Church will soon be unable to pay her staff. The Church is already incapable of paying her staff if it were an adequate staff. Therefore we must return to tent-making.

(3) The evangelistic motive. The adherents of this school argue that the modern apostles are hampered in their apostolate by their segregation from the ordinary life of the community. The placing of the clergy in a privileged position, it is argued, withdraws them from the normal life of modern society and renders them incapable of sharing fully in the fears and hopes of modern man. Country vicars have often claimed that the farming of their own glebe brought them into an organic relation with the common life of their agricultural community. School chaplains have claimed that their teaching of mathematics is no waste of time, but a necessary sharing in the common purpose of their society. Therefore, argues this school of thought, we must break down professional independence in the clergy, send them to share the work and the problems of the laity: and new doors for evangelism will be open.

(4) The industrial motive. This is a variation of motive number 3, as applied to industrial society. This school of thought is powerfully influenced by the work of Godin and Michonneau in France, or by Perrin's *Priest-Workman in Germany*. We have to recognize, it is argued, that society is no longer divided according to geographical areas. It is divided far more by social classes; the industrial community is a community with what almost amounts to a culture of its own. The average parish church represents an incurably bourgeois culture; and it is ridiculous to expect members of the working community in any number to feel themselves part of a Christian community which appears to be out of all relation to their purpose in life. The Church, though it claims to transcend local and disparate communities, can only create the Christian community by using and penetrating the secular communities which the social development has created. In the Middle Ages and after, the local community was the village. Accordingly the Church accepted that community, used

the sense of fellowship in it, and created the parochial system. To-day, it is argued, the community in industrial society is not the housing estate but the place of work: and this is proved by the power of the community sense in trade unionism. Therefore the Church must accept the factory as a new source of community, and use its sense of fellowship in creating the Christian fellowship. Therefore we must have priests who are factory workers; who do not *in the first instance* make any attempt to associate the workers with the parish church, but who gather round them a Christian fellowship within the working community. We must have our altar in the house of one of the workmen, and let that be the first centre of the new Christian community.

These diverse motives are not mutually exclusive. But it is important to recognize that they are diverse. For much discussion along these lines is hampered by a failure to recognize that the motives of the debaters are different. The small passage of arms between Mr D. L. Edwards and the Archdeacon of Nottingham (in THEOLOGY, September 1950) was in part due to a failure to observe that the Archdeacon was beginning with motive number 1, whereas Mr Edwards was beginning with motives number 3 and 4.

If this analysis is true, we must distinguish between two problems which are often confused. The general problem, that of the dilapidation of the parochial system, is a unity. But inside this problem there are two facets which may demand different approaches and different answers. There is the problem of supplying sufficient priests to supplement the present clergy and maintain the parochial system; and there is the problem of the priesthood in industrial society, the *immediate* object of which is not to maintain or supplement but to reach men in an environment which the parochial system does not touch. These problems in fact are not rigidly distinct: all those whose minds work along the lines of the Paris Mission intend that the house-church or the factory-church shall sooner or later be grafted and incorporated within the older system represented by the parish church: and the process of incorporation would be bound to supplement the ministry and assist in maintaining the parochial system. But the two problems must be treated in different ways. And it is possible that the Church could attempt at present to supply an answer to only one of them. It would be possible for the Church to inaugurate a ministry, intended to assist the parish priests, without touching even the fringes of the industrial communities. And conversely it would be possible for the Church to embark upon an assault upon industrial society, without thereby giving more than a minimal assistance in the maintenance of the parishes.

If we bear this distinction in mind, we can consider the remedies proposed by the various schools of thought.

(1) An extended use of trained laymen.

This is the proposal usually made by those who most clearly perceive the legal and practical difficulties of any jugglery with "priest-workmen" or order of deacons. If we ask what form this extended use of trained laymen will take, we most commonly find that it de-

pends upon an elevation of the status and extension of the training of the diocesan reader. The diocesan reader performs indispensable services to the Church, and it would be well if the order of readers were widely extended. But this proposal does no more than tinker superficially with the problems facing us. Perhaps it is all that we can do: but as an effective answer it does not begin to be adequate.

(2) The permanent diaconate.

It is suggested that we need what is in effect a new order of ministers. This can best be met by transforming the diaconate from a novitiate for priests into a supplementary ministry. We need a new order of ministry. Here ready to hand is an order which in the primitive Church carried defined duties and responsibilities and which has survived in a mangled form to the present day. Turn this order into something more nearly approximating to its primitive state, provide its members with the grace of order and (presumably) a partial sharing in the priestly apostolate.

This has legal difficulties: but they are not insuperable. Yet both conservatives and radicals dislike the notion. The conservatives argue that it seems to carry us little further than the extension of the readership. In practice the parish priest would find at his disposal more persons to help him with the administrations of the chalice: and it is possible that the transformation of an order of readers into an order of deacons might stamp a sense of apostolate and responsibility more deeply into the members of the order. But our readers are not well known for any lack of a sense of responsibility or apostolate. It is probable that our people in the parishes would accept an ordained deacon as their pastor in a way in which they would not accept a lay-reader. But the conservatives argue that the gains likely to accrue from this proposal would not be enough to warrant the enormous effort needed to create it and the obvious risks when it was created.

The radicals argue that the proposal fails, like the first, to touch the essence of the problem. All Christians share in the apostolate in some sense: but the apostolate in the ministerial sense is peculiarly associated with the altar and the Lord's Supper. We need men who will be able to be the centre of the life of a local church: and no one can be the centre of a local church without the ability to stand at the altar and administer the Lord's Body. Nothing but the priesthood is enough. It is difficult for the radical not to feel that the strongest argument in the minds of those who make this proposal is fear—fear of the risks, practical and disciplinary, run by any system of ordaining to the priesthood. All the arguments favouring the ordination of larger numbers of persons to the diaconate also favour the ordination of larger number of persons to the priesthood: and the only reason why the diaconate should be preferred to the priesthood is that the authorities are still able to retain a firm hand upon the administration of the Sacraments. This need for a firm hand is not to be despised. But it is an illusion to suppose that the Church's authority would be much less fully committed by the ordination of deacons than it would be by the ordination of priests.

And it is doubtful whether many members of a permanent diaconate would be content to remain deacons. They would soon start asking for ordination to the priesthood. And for this they should not be blamed. A man attempting under difficulties to perform the duties of an apostle is not to be blamed for desiring the order which will enable him more fully to be an apostle. A doctor might be an effective Christian worker if he was a deacon. He would be still more effective if he could take the full responsibility of preparing his patient for confirmation and administering the holy communion to him.

In short, argue the radicals, the reason for making our supplementary clergy deacons instead of priests, can almost be reduced to this: we must ensure that the supplementary clergy are never able to forget that they are only supplementary: and this negative reason is not good enough.

There is probably more to be said for a permanent diaconate than many of its assailants suppose. But the adherents of this theory must face the formidable practical difficulty of getting the Church to agree to a program which is criticized by both the conservative and the radical.

(3) Ordination to the priesthood for the purpose of assisting the parish priest in his normal duties.

This might take a variety of forms. The obvious method is to take good Christian doctors, schoolmasters, solicitors and business men, send them for one or more courses to a theological college, and ordain them in the ordinary way. This has in fact already happened, though it could probably happen more frequently.

The defect of this system is that it is not, and can never be, a system. It is haphazard: it depends on finding the right man in the right place: and it can only be applied, in general, to professional and middle-class persons. It is all very well for Mr Edwards to accuse the Archdeacon of Nottingham for failing to include members of the trades unions in his list of potential clergy. Professional men are not always more intelligent than those engaged in more practical labour. Far from it. But a teacher in the Church needs the ability to handle abstract ideas: and the average member of the professions has at present endured far more training in the handling of abstractions than the average member of a trade union. It is not difficult to supply an experienced and well-read and well-instructed Christian solicitor with all the theological and devotional training that he will need. To provide the same to the member of a trade union, if we exclude the exceptional person, might well mean that he has to be withdrawn from his trade union for a prolonged period. The Church has already taken many ordinands from among working men, and given them a long training and received thereby excellent priests. But these ordinands have normally been accepted when young: this method is not likely to become very common with older men.

Thus the most obvious method, though not to be despised, is inadequate to meet the problem. We want leaders for the Church: we

shall not get them by laying hands suddenly on large numbers of more or less devout Christian laymen. We should be warned by the experiences of the Elizabethan Church.

There is, however, one method which has neither been tried nor examined, and which deserves a more prolonged study than it has yet received. The advocates of this theory argue that we must continue to ordain persons to the ministry in the ordinary way: but that we should also begin at the universities to proclaim the call to *ordination*, but not to the profession of a whole-time parson, to men who intend to enter secular professions. Let us take a concrete example of this scheme. A young scientist comes to Cambridge with the intention of being a scientist. He is, or becomes, a Christian and wishes to do his utmost for the Church, but he feels that his right place is nevertheless in the laboratory. We should, it is argued, place before him the call to ordination: and put before him a method by which he can undertake his scientific studies at the same time that he is a priest in the Church. He would then read for a degree in Natural Sciences. After obtaining his degree he would pass into a theological college in the ordinary way. At the end of his training he would not at once be ordained, but would enter the field of industry or scientific research, according to his bent and his ability. There would be no conditions placed on where he should go for his job: he would be free to accept work anywhere: though the knowledge of the priestly needs of a particular area might influence his decision in accepting a post. He would then act as a layman in his job until he had found his feet (say for a period of three months). At the end of that time he would be ordained deacon in the ordinary way, would be licensed to a parish (though this would not necessarily be the parish in which his work lay), and continue his scientific work: he would later be ordained priest in the ordinary way after a year or such other period as the bishop felt desirable. There his function would be both to gather a church within his working community and to assist the ministrations of the vicar to whose parish he was attached.

This is only an extension of the principle which has been adopted in the past with certain schoolmasters. It has manifest defects. The worst of these defects is the absence of any whole-time parochial experience as part of his theological training. Many of us feel that the most valuable part of the training for the priesthood is less the theological college than the first two or three years as a curate with pastoral responsibility. Yet some may feel that the advantages outweigh this—that it is better to have priests who have never been full-time priests than to have no priests. This method would overcome the objection against any supplementary clergy that they would want to become full-time clergy: for plainly it would be very desirable if these trained supplementary clergy wanted to become full-time clergy.

One thing is certain. At our universities at the moment there is a large number of persons who are dedicated Christians, who would like to do all they can for the Church, but do not in modern condi-

tions feel called to the parochial ministry. The Church is not using these men as it ought. They go down from the university and get lost or partially lost in the tumult of modern society, and it is frequently difficult for the local parish priest to give even the best of them the Christian responsibility which they ought to share. If we could present the call to vocation to ministry, although the man is not to be discouraged but encouraged to enter his intended profession, we might find a response. The writer believes that he has known several men who ought to have done this very thing and who would have borne fruit in the pastoral work of the Church.

It may be argued that this is making the call to vocation too easy: we are not demanding from the men the utter self-renunciation which alone can make a Christ-like priest. But at present we are demanding from many of our clergy that they should be St Francis of Assisi. It is desirable that their renunciation should be as complete as that of Francis. But a Church which makes it a *condition*, a *sine qua non*, that its clergy should all be St Francises cannot hope to survive indefinitely. And it is easy to exaggerate the difference between the renunciation demanded from the whole-time priest and the renunciation demanded of the priest in a secular occupation. We can imagine circumstances in which the priest in the secular occupation needed a more absolute renunciation. To be responsible for carrying the Gospel into a man's working community demands both self-sacrifice and responsibility. And there is no doubt at all that while the full-time vicar has pastoral opportunities far beyond those open to the priest working in a profession, the priest in the profession has pastoral opportunities which are not normally open to the incumbent whose work lies apart from the ordinary working purpose of the community.

(4) Ordination to the priesthood in industry.

The less radical solution to the problem of breaking down the barrier between Church and industry is to take the normally trained priest and send him to work in the mill: to follow the example of Henri Perrin and others. In the diocese of Sheffield and elsewhere attempts are being made to give ordinands experience of industrial work: and in recent months a few graduates have proceeded into temporary industrial jobs before entering upon their training at a theological college. It has also been suggested that the length of training at a theological college should be extended to a third year, with the object of compelling all ordinands to undergo industrial experience during their theological training.

That many priests in the Church should have industrial experience is plainly desirable. There are two difficulties: first, whether we can really afford the man-power to send priests, who are able men fully capable of the greater pastoral sphere of a parish, into a very absorbing and tiring job of labour; and secondly, whether this method is capable of achieving its desired results. The need is not only a sharing in industrial experience. We need men who participate in the mentality of the working man. Those with the most right to speak say that a few months' work in a factory, with the know-

ledge that this is only a preparation for something else, does not in fact enable the subject to share the mentality of the working man.

It is evident that the Perrins, the fully trained priests entering a sphere of life in origin foreign to their background, will always be a small group of exceptional people. There cannot and ought not to be any large-scale movement of priests into industry.

The industrial society, it is therefore argued, must, like any other mission field, be taught to produce its own priests. These priests must be trained in their working environment. A working man who is abstracted from his work for anything from two to five years at a theological college will not return to his mill the same working man. He will have acquired a smattering of the church's method of approach to the middle classes and he will probably have disqualified himself for effective leadership in the mill.

This is a hard saying. For it is not easy to discern any adequate method of training so long as the working man remains a full-time worker. The Communists succeed in training working men in leadership by a combination of night classes, week-end courses, and summer camps. Perhaps these are the only methods open to Christians. But it is easy to see the night classes degenerating into a series of not very efficient confirmation classes: and it is easy to imagine that in many industries the Christian leader might prove to have none of the qualities of leadership except devotion.

To believe in the efficiency of schemes of this kind you have to believe in the partial independence of an industrial society as a social unit. Many parish priests are still convinced that the emphasis upon the social sense in industry can easily be overdone, and that the fundamental social unit is still the place where men live rather than the place where they work—the village, the suburb, the housing estate rather than the mill, the mine, the docks. There is still a "concealed" community even in a London suburb. The radicals reply that they do not claim the mill or the docks to be the social unit in the same sense that the village was: but that nevertheless this way of diagnosing the Church's problem suggests fruitful avenues of pastoral approach, avenues which the old pastoral attitude largely neglected.

Perhaps the industrial mission field must produce its own priests. But let us be certain what a task we are setting those priests. They will undergo the strain of adding to some very tiring manual labour a certain amount of equally exhausting intellectual labour. The people who have experimented with this kind of combination, priesthood and manual labour, assert that the "wear and tear" is very severe—upon the physical, intellectual, and spiritual energy. Men could stand up to this kind of strain only if they possessed a profound personal discipline and an adequate theological background. Yet we are proposing to subject to this strain men who are going to receive a training in prayer and theology which is still uncertain but which can scarcely be as profound as those of the average middle-class theological student. The disciples of Brother Lawrence argue that a monotonous job affords a heaven-sent opportunity for

the practice of continual recollection. But not everyone is Brother Lawrence: and for most men the practice of continual recollection is not something which can just be picked up at the conveyor belt, but requires a long discipline and a growth of a prayer-vocabulary not easily acquired under the conditions which we are trying to imagine.

But no one has produced any other answer which even theoretically meets the problem of industry. Until they do, we may justly press on with the investigation of this line of approach.

If any of these proposals were to be put into practice by the Church, we may try to imagine the ministry of the Church in 1970. There would be a large number of whole-time clergy, bishops, archdeacons, men given canonries for the purpose of research and scholarship, rectors of parishes. But the parish would be a larger area: and from the incumbent would be demanded a higher standard of teaching: he would have necessarily to be responsible for the training and pastoral welfare of the other priests working in the parish. These whole-time priests would still run into thousands, but they would be sufficiently few for the Church to ensure that they were relieved from the fear of poverty and that they were able to give their whole attention to being full-time. Within the parishes, varying according to the circumstances of the parish, would be a number of priests gainfully employed in whole-time secular occupations. In most parishes these would still be drawn from the graduate class in the population. In industrial parishes a wholly different type of priest would be working in the mills. These supplementary clergy would all be under the general direction and supervision of the rectors of the parishes or of a team specially appointed by the bishops for this duty of supervision. There could be interchange according to need and vocation between the whole-time and the supplementary.

The one question at the back of everyone's mind is whether priesthood is compatible with a secular occupation. There is plainly nothing against it from the theological side: the objection is practical—if a man is a doctor and a priest will he not necessarily be a doctor first and a priest second? A bishop who was once a headmaster wrote in his autobiography that "ordination adds a savour to the work of an assistant master". We do not want that: yet we are, if schemes of this kind go through, bound to run that risk. At the same time let us not fall into the medieval trap of supposing that the Church necessarily demands a less whole-hearted offering from the laity than from the clergy. The Church calls the doctor to worship and service as ardently as she calls the priest: and his doctoring must be as much a part of his worship as the stoking of the church boiler is a part of the vicar's worship.

Let us summarize the platform of the adherents of schemes of this kind. The parochial system cannot be maintained in its fullness, and it is useless to pretend that it can. Even if we are to suppose that it could be even adequately staffed we must regard it as incapable of dealing with the pastoral problems created for the Church by industrial society. The only remedy, and that a partial one, lies in experi-

menting with a supplementary ministry. No supplementary ministry can be as effective as a whole-time ministry. Not for nothing did the presbyters of the primitive Church abandon their secular trades and businesses. We can only point to some possible gain in compensation for very serious loss—the new evangelistic approach possible through the closing of one of the gaps between the clergy and the non-Christian. Every kind of experiment carries with it dangers: and it would be fatal to embark upon a vast ground-nuts scheme without first proceeding to a period of experiment and testing. But the Church is not in a position where danger lies in one direction and safety in another. There is a danger on either hand, in conservatism and in radicalism: and it is our business to try to determine which danger must be faced for the sake of the salvation of souls.

W. O. Chadwick.

The Philosophy of Language, or the Study of Framework

In a former article, in differentiating contemporary trends of thought, we gave a general account of a kind of philosophy which we called "scientific", as opposed to another kind of philosophy which we called "direct".

We could restate this differentiation shortly by saying that the "direct" philosopher claims for philosophy that it is self-authenticating. He claims to be able, by the direct and exclusive use of philosophical methods, to arrive at the knowledge of beauty, goodness, and truth. As opposed to this, the "scientific" philosopher considers philosophy to be the activity of correlating and interrelating the special branches of knowledge by first examining, and then comparing, the foundations of each. The "scientific" philosopher considers therefore that philosophy, in itself, has no authoritativeness as a guide to ontological reality. The only way in which it gains any authority, if it does, is by taking this over—borrowing it, as it were—from the special studies which it contrasts or correlates.

There is a strong case for considering that this "scientific" philosophy is the legitimate heir to that older type of philosophy which correlated, or attempted to correlate, the different ways of knowing, since it is the differentiation of these produced by the development of new "techniques" which has caused the special branches of knowledge to split off from the undifferentiated parent subject which once constituted philosophy. If this is so, the philosophical vocation, far from narrowing, has widened with the progress of knowledge almost intolerably, since its efficient exercise now requires that either the individual philosopher or groups of philosophers working in collaboration shall have some familiarity with all the special branches of knowledge. Moreover, the designation "special branches of knowledge" is inclusive of, but far wider than, that of "special sciences". This "scientific" philosophy then, rightly seen, is nothing else but

metaphysics in its modern form. No amount of protesting that it is "anti-metaphysical" (i.e. "antimetaphysical" in a restricted sense of "metaphysics") can alter this fact.

Going back now to our "scientific" philosopher struggling to master the totality of new knowledge without ever becoming vague or superficial, let us ask ourselves the question, what on earth is he to do?

Apart from taking the obvious step of instituting a close co-operation between himself and other "scientific" philosophers with differing specialities, there is one obvious thing which he can do, and it is this: *he can endeavour to develop general techniques which will help him in his grapple, not merely with one or other special subject, but with the whole range.*

This is not as difficult a matter as at first sight it may seem. For first, all subjects of human study, whatever they may be, depend for their ultimate information on observations, or *perceptions*, of some kind, coming from without or within. The general study of the nature and varieties of perception and introspection, therefore, is one in which the "scientific" philosopher is perennially engaged. It is this study which, in our time, has led to the intricacies of what is known as the Sense-Data Problem, the unravelling of which seems in the opinion of some of us, to have come, temporarily at any rate, to a dead end.

Secondly, all subjects of study whatsoever, without exception, are undertaken, in fact, by *human beings*. Any study, therefore, which appears to throw light upon the nature of humanity, and especially on the process of creative activity, will have priority in a "scientific" philosopher's eyes. It is this assignment of priorities which makes him interested in the nature of contemplative discipline and of myth and liturgy, though possibly this interest is not of the kind which a religious man might desire. There is a noticeable feeling, however, among philosophers that no adequate explanation of these phenomena has been given as yet.

Other questions relevant to the study of the nature of man also keep cropping up. The implications of anthropological research and clinical psychology to the nature of morals is one of these. Another is the question whether such studies as *gestalt* psychology and modern neurosurgery do or do not throw light on the problem of the "objectivity" of what we see and hear. Strictly speaking, they do not, for they have only brought to public notice in a more scientific form facts which have many of them been known since ancient times. Their development, however, has tended to underline the fact that what Kantian philosophers used to call "the raw material of sensation" is already, even in its rawest forms, a highly doctored affair. A philosopher can no longer, as Bertrand Russell did, confidently make the ultimate components of the world to consist of a solid, common, incorrigible basis of "atomic facts"; since "facts", symbols, and perceptions are now acknowledged to be interacting to an extent which they were not thought to be before.

If, however, "facts" have tended to desolidify, symbols have be-

come "live". They have, moreover, pushed themselves to the forefront of philosophic interest. For the third generalization which can be made about all known subjects of study is that *all kinds of knowledge, without any exception whatever, are formulatable in some kind of language.* This is equivalent to saying—taking a wide view of "language"—that *all kinds of knowledge are formulatable in some kind of symbolism the nature of whose operations can be ascertained.* And it is this alleged common characteristic of all subjects of study which lies behind the development of the philosophy of language.

The four famous sentences which can be taken as having initiated the philosophy of language are the following, from Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1922).

(*a*) "4 The thought is the significant proposition."
"4.001 The totality of propositions is the language."
(*b*) "4.0031 All philosophy is 'Critique of language' (but not at all in Mauthner's sense)."
(*c*) "5.6 *The limits of my language* mean the limits of my world" (italics Wittgenstein's).

This altogether remarkable book made a European impact not only because of its own intrinsic qualities, but also because it brought the work of a long succession of symbolic logicians, culminating in Frege and Russell, to the notice of a long succession of philosophers of science, culminating in Mach and Schlick.

One thing, however, needs to be immediately emphasized. All the quotations from it given above are quoted here, as they always are, out of their context. And it happens that in the case of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* the general context determines the meaning of the particular sentence to a unique extent. Anyone who can imagine a whole book consisting of one single gigantic sentence will gain a fair idea of what the form of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* is. There is no break in it anywhere, no "full stop". On the other hand, the book is by no means a collection of assorted aphorisms. The highly developed system of linkage between the propositions which constitute it is given by the numbers which stand at the left side of each. And although at first sight this system of linkage, which the author himself says that he has elaborated in order to assign to the separate propositions of his book an order of logical emphasis, bears no relation to any ordinary "sentence" (i.e. to any sentence written in subject-predicate form) yet it does bear a very noticeable resemblance to sentential constructions found in languages which have, in the Indo-European sense of the words, "no parts of speech". Thus the assertion that the whole *Tractatus* forms one great sentence is one which can seriously be maintained.

Moreover the *Tractatus* is not merely one gigantic sentence. It exhibits also the development of a gigantic metaphor, with a number of submetaphors arising out of the central one, and controlled by it. It therefore "shows" the fact that "all language is metaphoric" (as I. A. Richards or Mrs Langer respectively say that it is in *The*



Philosophy of Rhetoric (1936) and *Philosophy in a New Key* (1942)). Leaving aside the obviously pressing question of what exactly is here meant by "metaphoric", the next point to be stressed is that the *Tractatus*-metaphor consists in the development of a central conception, "language", *which is taken, as the central conception in all metaphors is taken, in at least two senses simultaneously*; a "figurative" sense in which "language" means "symbolic logical system", and a "literal" sense in which it means English, French, German, etc.—*i.e.* "natural language". One of the major misunderstandings which have gathered round the *Tractatus* derives from the fact that whereas Wittgenstein is being explicitly ambiguous, and is advertising the fact that he is being so by the form he has chosen, nearly all his commentators, ignoring the form of the book, have seized exclusively on one or other of these senses of "language" as "what Wittgenstein really means".

We must now ask ourselves: What is the central question which this logical poet asks about "language"? What is the central distinction which he makes within it? Most philosophers have answered this question by indicating, in turn, Wittgenstein's many identifications; that between "thought" and "language", for example, between "language" and "symbolism", between "symbolism" and "system", between "rules of grammar" and "rules of logic". Actually the central idea of the *Tractatus* is to be found not in any comparison, but in a fundamental distinction; i.e. that between things in "language" which can only be "shown" and things which cannot be "shown" but can be "said". ("4.1212 What *can* be shown *cannot* be said.") In general, the idea is that what can be "shown" but not "said" is anything to do with an inexpressible, but fundamental, "logic of representation", of picturing, of facts. ("4.0312 My fundamental thought is . . . that the *logic* of the facts cannot be represented.") This "logic", though it cannot be expressed in Logic (i.e. in the massive Frege-Russell logic, some further future refinement of which, it is now universally agreed, will provide the definitive foundations of mathematics), is one which Wittgenstein appears to know a great deal about. It is, in two senses of "picture"—one literal, one figurative—a "picture of the facts"; a clue to its essential nature is to be found by looking at hieroglyphs, and at metaphors, similes, and images; it contains no logical constants; in it objects are combined like links in a chain, and in a definite way; it is a logic of "sense"—i.e. of direction; and, by implication, it is a logic of emphasis—as indeed also are the set of principles according to which are linked the very propositions of the book itself.

Now, naturally this determined effort by Wittgenstein to express what he himself says cannot be expressed gives the reader an unpleasant feeling of having to absorb paradox after paradox. And the feeling of being tantalized becomes even more acute when Wittgenstein roundly asserts that among the things which can be "shown" but not "said" are all the most important things of life. All the traditional problems of philosophy: the law of causality, for instance; ethics; the will; eternity; death; immortality; the operations

of God; the mystical—all these "show" themselves, but can't be "said".

"6.51 Scepticism is *not* irrefutable, but palpably senseless, if it would doubt where a question cannot be asked."
"6.52 We feel that even if *all possible* scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at all."
"6.521 The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of this problem."
(Is this not the reason why men to whom after long doubting the sense of life became clear could not then say wherein this sense consisted?)
"6.522 There is inded the inexpressible. This *shows* itself; it is the mystical."
"7 Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."

This is how this baffling but quite obviously not irreligious book ends. One is irresistibly reminded by it of the riddles propounded by the Masters of Zen Buddhism, the object of which was to disillusion thinkers with thought itself.

At a later stage the case will be put forward for saying that Wittgenstein's "logic of representation" can actually be constructed provided the whole Frege-Russell logic be abandoned, and a logic imagined which is based on the principle of concatenation of links in a chain. In this new logic, of course, everything that can only be "shown" in the Frege-Russell logic will be able to be "said", and everything that can be "said" in the Frege-Russell logic will have to be "shown". At this stage, however, this new suggestion will merely sound like still one more paradox, and it is therefore best let lie.

What is worth asking is, "If the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* is really, in part at any rate, a religious meditation, why has so explicitly irreligious a school of philosophy as that of [the genuine] Logical Positivists been founded on it?" The answer is that the Logical Positivists fastened on only half the book. They developed only Wittgenstein's ideas about the Frege-Russell logic; they ignored his apparently fantastic ideas about the "logic of facts". They dropped the whole distinction between what could be "shown" and what could be "said", though they tried to keep his further, cognate distinction between "nonsense" and "sense", which itself makes no sense unless it depends on the prior distinction between what is "shown" and what is "said". The upshot was that the Logical Positivists distorted Wittgenstein's whole conception, and a largely irreligious school of thought claimed to derive from the work of a most religious man. This derivation, in fact, is partial only. It needs to be questioned and in a manner that will become widely known.

The basic statement, which is derivable from the *Tractatus*, and on which the philosophy of language is founded, *that all knowledge is formulatable in a language*, is itself obviously, also, a generalization which can be questioned. It is actually an assumption—if you like, a "discovery". It is often disputed by "direct" philosophers who

bring forward cases in which knowledge is said to have been obtained without the operation of any symbolism; and it is a matter of opinion whether these cases disprove the assumption underlying the whole "philosophy of language" or not. Actually philosophic opinion is more and more tending to the view that they do not. One commonly cited case in particular, which is that of the nature of mystical experience, actually strengthens the case for the linguistic idea. For investigation shows that the purest mystical intuitions known to Catholic Christianity—the sudden and "passive", that is, as opposed to the "active" and long-lasting type—always leave the imprint upon the mind of some symbolic framework, or *species*, and one, moreover, within which some symbolic operation always occurs. Thenceforward, in ritual, poetry, trade manuals, sciences, and mathematics (this is putting the general linguistic presupposition very roughly), the underlying symbolic *framework*, or *limit*, becomes more and more plain. And it is what linguistic philosophers, following Wittgenstein, call "rules of grammar", "principles of logic", and, within the field of number, "postulates of mathematics", which give the directions, in the case of the specific kind of symbolism which is used in each subject, for limiting its range of operations, for determining its "frame". "Unframed thinking is no thinking" has been an instinctive intellectual watchword to nearly all the great minds of the past. Linguistic philosophy, taking it generally, makes this instinct explicit by throwing new light on the natures of the symbolic operations by means of which, in no matter what kind of symbolism, the systematization, or framing-up process, occurs.

Linguistic philosophy, then, is the study of framework. Every sort and variety of linguistic framework, structure, and pattern, every conceivable way in which statements in any language can be connected together, as well as examination of the function and structure of isolated statements, taken separately—all this falls within its scope. Four foci of interest in particular, however, sustain linguistic philosophers' interest at the present time. One is the examination of *games* of all kinds, both in theory, as a branch of non-metrical mathematics (*Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour*, Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1948), and as exemplified in actual games, plays, and rituals, these being felt to be the oldest form of *system* known to mankind (*Homo Ludens*, Huizinga, 1944). Another is the analytic study of natural languages, and, in particular, the revolutionary conception of grammar now being developed by American linguists, and originating with Bloomfield and Sapir. A third (which is so far an English speciality) is the deployment, stretching, and distortion, for examinatory purposes, of our logically vastly complicated and scientifically fundamental "ordinary language". This is especially useful as a corrective to pontificating logicians, who are both apt to think they know just what "all language" is like, and also that nothing counts as "science" which is not expressible in mathematical formulas. The study of "ordinary language" also acts as a source of inspiration to the invention of new logics, and to "foundational research" into a great many apparently secure tech-

nical concepts, including those of the grammatical parts of speech. It becomes cramping and sterile, however, when it leads to the hypostatization of "ordinary English" as being the sole ultimate medium in which everything must be said.

Yet a fourth focus of linguistic philosophical interest is the study of childlike and anthropologically primitive languages—real and imagined. The presupposition behind this last activity is that, as we are all children and primitives ourselves "under the skin", the anthropological primitive may turn out to be the basis upon which that which is logically primitive must be built up. This suggestion was actually first put forward in a very remarkable passage, in Book II of his *Logic*, by Mill.

This general survey of the linguistic countryside has inevitably been breathless; it will suffice, however, if enough has been said to give some idea of why "the philosophy of language" attracts. In this account, moreover, no stress has been laid on the brilliant modern developments which have been made in symbolic logic; or on the work on the foundations of physics, and on Probability-Theory, for which the Logical Positivists have become so justly famed. The reason why most linguistic philosophers do not like being called "Logical Positivists" is twofold, and needs to be explained. The first is that "Logical Positivism" was the manifesto-name of the Vienna Circle, which specialized on work on the foundations of science. Thus the sense of "metaphysics" in which they were "anti-metaphysical" was the special sense elaborated by August Comte as the second of the three intellectual stages (theological, metaphysical, positivistic) through which mankind has passed. It must be emphasized that the "positivism" which occurs in the name "Logical Positivism" was not altogether the "positivism" of Comte, since the Logical Positivists accepted neither his restricted view of science nor his Religion of Humanity. But "metaphysical" did mean for them, as for Comte, "metaphysical within science"; "sense" and "nonsense" meant " 'sense' and 'nonsense' within a science", and so on all through. (A detailed and reliable account of the development of Logical Positivism within the Vienna Circle is given in Philip Frank's *Between Physics and Philosophy*, 1944.) Thus, quite strictly speaking, no one should call himself a Logical Positivist unless he is engaged on scientific "foundational research".

There is, however, a second reason for shying away from the label. Some of the Logical Positivists, notably Carnap, commit to a really exceptional extent the common philosophical fault of premature generalization from data which afterwards turn out not to have been complete. Any logic upon which Carnap is at work is "Logic"; any group of languages with which he is acquainted, "Language". The only languages which he in fact takes seriously are "ideal languages" (i.e. logical systems). Natural languages, which are in his view defective and despicable approximations to logical systems, can be disposed of philosophically at an early stage, since any element in them which cannot be formalized in Logic can be held to be not "repre-

sentational" but only "emotive". Wittgenstein's distinction between "showing" and "saying" is, of course, left out.

Now, this sweeping and high-handed treatment of linguistic problems, which not only ignores half the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, but also and equally the difficulties presented by Indo-Chinese languages, ordinary colloquial speech, poetry, mystical writings, and non-systematic science, has provoked such a very violent reaction among linguistic philosophers that it has discredited the name of Logical Positivist to a considerable extent. It is therefore really very irritating to a linguistic philosopher to be called a Logical Positivist (and taunted with being a moral coward when he says he is not), when (*a*) the label is incorrect, since he has no connexion with the Vienna Circle and is, most probably, not doing work on the foundations of any science, and (*b*) he is engaged with all his energy in refuting those notorious and premature generalizations for which the name now stands.

Thus linguistic philosophy is *not* Logical Positivism, and it was Logical Positivism which, for various reasons, was irreligious. We cannot, however, leave the whole matter there. For this analysis of the particular differences between Logical Positivism and linguistic philosophy brings up the more general question of the widespread ignorance about what linguistic philosophy is or is not. Like every new intellectual development, linguistic philosophy has certain characteristic faults and dangers. One of these is Carnap's tendency to premature generalization, which has just been mentioned, and which was also present in the early work of Ayer. Another is Ryle's tendency, which was also strong in Comte, to think that every problem can be solved by eliminating abstract nouns. Another is the deification of "ordinary language"; and still another the general tendency mentioned in a former article, to content oneself with examination of isolated statements, instead of considering also the ways in which these link up.

The existence of these faults would not be a grave matter if the linguistic movement had not become identified with them. It is, more than any other one thing, this identification of its weaknesses with itself which is responsible for its further general identification with crude versions of irreligion, attitude-ethics, and also with behaviourism of various kinds.

It is the fact that it is possible to assert with confidence that each stage of this double identification is false which makes it possible to reopen the question of what the relations of linguistic philosophy, as it really is, are to religious faith.

It comes to this: How shall we embark on the study of religious frameworks? What are the principles which reveal the logical structures of ritual ceremonies, creeds, hymns, myths—in short, what, logically speaking, *is* "religious language"?

MARGARET MASTERMAN.

Great Preachers—II. Bossuet

The name of Bossuet conjures up for the English reader the picture of the Court preacher, florid and pompous in style, ingratiating and extravagant in manner. Such a preacher may be thought no example or inspiration for the modern pulpit, where the emphasis is upon brevity and what is called sincerity. He is usually regarded as the literary exemplar of a period of culture when external pressures were so light that it was possible for men so to gild the arts of living with extraneous embellishment that it soon became impossible to discern any sign of life beneath the struggling mass of ornamentation.

W. Fraser Mitchell, the author of one of our few studies of the sermon as a form of rhetoric, compares Bossuet with Jeremy Taylor and pronounces in favour of the English divine, dismissing the *Oraisons Funèbres* as "mere laudatory harangues and, however excellent they may have been as eulogies, were ill suited alike to his sacred office and the circumstance of their delivery" (*English Pulpit Oratory*, p. 254).

Bossuet was indeed a Court preacher and so found himself constantly set before crucial moral choices which put certainly his ecclesiastical future and, on one or two occasions, perhaps even his life in danger. It was not possible for him to evade the responsibilities of the prophet by a few irrelevant asides on the Sunday gospel. He knew that if he could influence the king and the Court he could influence France and, as things then stood, Europe and Christendom too.

If it is the mark of genius to see the universal in the particular and the particular in the universal, then Bossuet had to the full this Augustinian gift. The greatness of his famous funeral oration for Henrietta Maria is to be found in just this, that through the life of this one woman, who was by turns frivolous and pious, and was for all this called to be the consort of a martyred king and to work out in her own life all the moral problems involved in dynastic marriage and incompatibility of religion and of race, and finally found herself set in the midst of the English rebellion, he could see mirrored in that personal history the whole story of the eternal destiny of man. For, almost alone of great Christians up to his time, he was set in a truly biblical tradition and so was able to treat the movement of history with seriousness. He saw all that happened, in Europe or in the life of one soul, as a not wholly unintelligible part of a great purpose which, in outline at least, could be glimpsed from the history of the Jews, from the tradition of the Church, and from the rise and fall of the empires of classical antiquity.

He was born in 1627 of a social class and with a cultural background more in keeping with the kind of world which was being made than with the romantic remnants of that which was already passing away. He was educated, characteristically, by the Jesuits. But he did not choose to join them. His vocation was not to influence his country positively and from outside, but by an absorption into

its actual life and by a sharing in it so complete that he has come to be regarded by many as a mere time-server. His university education was traditional and successful. There are few of his orations more touching than that which he delivered over the body of his aged and revered teacher, Nicolas Cornet, Master of the College of Navarre, on 27 June 1663. For Bossuet, like many other eminent ecclesiastics, suffered from a perpetual bad conscience. He felt called to high responsibilities and he undoubtedly enjoyed the exercise of the power it gave him. But with it all was a deep and genuine desire for solitude, study, and a life of humble anonymity. "Les deux augustes cardinaux qui ont soutenu la majesté de cet empire, ont voulu donner la recompense due à son merite, mais il a tout refusé." Bossuet seems to have wished that he too had had the courage to make the kind of renunciation which had been possible for Nicolas Cornet.

The period of his canonry at Metz was a time of profound study, biblical and patristic especially. For the grand manner of Bossuet is not the self-inflation of the windbag: it springs from that massive capacity for assimilation which is another mark of genius. The same sermon for Nicolas Cornet suggests some principles and ideals which Bossuet pursued with fidelity throughout his life. In moral matters, he says, the Church in France has suffered from two plagues. There are those who conceive it to be their duty to discover reasons for every kind of moral laxity, provided as many as possible can be kept under the loose and lightly born integument of Catholic discipline. There are others, who are in such violent reaction from this, that they pass to the extreme of rigorism and regard no one as Christian who does not share their passionate enthusiasms, and then pass on to the fatal error of supposing that what was perhaps a legitimate response on their own part to a divine call was the necessary response for every man. "The enemy of our salvation avails himself of the services of both of these extremists, 'employant la facilité de ceux-la pour rendre la vice aimable, et la verité de ceux-ci pour rendre la vertu odieuse'."

His wider and deeper experience of men and, perhaps, his deeper acquaintance with classical culture brought him to a wiser resolution of this age-old dilemma. For he saw in the laxism of the Jesuits the promise of a hollow victory which might retain many within the Church only at the cost of the sacrifice of essential moral principle. The extremists on the other side, whether they were in fact Jansenists or of the type of zealots like de Rancé, he described as "blind children of Adam whom an unhappy 'désir de savoir' had cast into an abyss of ignorance" and who had forgotten the classical and Christian principle of *mediocritas* "in which justice, truth, and right reason alike have set their throne". It is small wonder that he was read with such enthusiasm by the Anglican divines of the Restoration.

To those who have this capacity for assimilation there seems to be no question, no situation which can catch them unprepared. All human folly and all human wisdom is seen as the example of some

great overruling principle. The time may come when this very principle becomes itself a snare. The womb of history brings forth some new and unexpected mutation and it becomes tempting either to ignore it altogether or so seriously to misconceive it—because by its very novelty it has no place in the pre-existing scheme—that the errors of the great can be more disastrous than the fumbling of fools.

Was there ever an age like this seventeenth century in France? When so much devotion was mixed with so much humbug? When the greatness and wretchedness of men—and of women too—were so widely displayed? When a notorious female like Madame de Montespan could keep with exactness the minutiae of Christian discipline with the exquisitely French and apparently logical defence, "Faut-il, parce que je fais un mal, faire tous les autres?" This was the kind of situation with which the preacher was confronted, and how skilfully Bossuet surmounted it! "Mais avant que de finir, il faut que je m'adresse à toi, royale maison, et que je te dise deux mots . . . ce grand example est digne d'être imité. Mais je me trompe, tu l'imites et dans sa doctrine et dans ses moeurs: continue et persevere."

It was the ruthless sincerity of the English in their rebellion which horrified Bossuet. "Do not think", he says, "that it is simply some quarrel about bishops or about some trifles in the Anglican Liturgy which have caused these disasters. At bottom it is a secret disgust of all authority whatsoever and an insatiable desire for novelty for its own sake and for experiment; so that once one starts overturning things there is no chance of calling a halt". The reaction of Bossuet to the English in their rebellious mood is exactly like that of Burke at a later date to the French in theirs. In both cases it springs from the fundamental Christian conviction that, once human passions are aroused, it is not possible to distinguish between the overthrow of those positive decrees which are the expression of the politics of a day, and those eternal laws which are the very ground of the natural order.

The confidential files of Colbert noted him as an ecclesiastic of keen intellect, "sympathetic, eager to please, and ready to agree with everyone, most unwilling to take sides, lest by doing so he should hinder the attainment of his real object". This does not sound too good, though it is not revealed what the writer thought his "real object" was. If he had ambition it was to wield power in the place where its exercise was to him most sweet—in the minds and hearts and wills of others. But an apparently ingratiating manner is a constant reproach thrown in the teeth of those whose temperament is synthetic rather than analytic, who seek to unite and elevate rather than to divide and to debase. The balance of divine truth calls for the exercise of both of these operations. This very capacity which was a source of reproach to Bossuet was the motive power of his immense energy as a controversialist. He really did enter into the minds of his opponents. His forte was the reconversion to Catholicism of "men of good sense" like Turenne, whose return was his greatest triumph. But this very quality of spirit which breathes

through every word he wrote, and every sermon he delivered, meant that for him the radical solution of personal problems which was possible for de Rancé, was foreclosed. We must, however, credit him with sincerity when he claims that the life of the Court and the responsibilities of high ecclesiastical office and the burden of controversial activity and of writing did involve real sacrifice.

Through all his sermons there breathes indeed an air of calm sincerity, very far removed from the fiction of ornate flattery with which he is usually credited. For great French prose—like great French verse—has a curiously intoxicating quality for the unwary English reader. It can easily become a kind of incantation and its toxic effects must be resisted. The style of Bossuet, even where it becomes most declamatory, is still chaste, classical, and restrained. Of all the writings of antiquity it is closest to Cicero. It is as free from the Rabbinism of Andrewes as it is untouched by that too frequent conning of the commonplace book which diverts, while it distracts, the reader of Jeremy Taylor. Hardly ever is there a direct classical allusion in his sermons, and his oratory seems poised at that point of moral elevation where the heights of the natural creation are transfigured by the glory of God revealed in Christ, manifested in the Church, and reflected in the saints. An English reader would be hard put to it to distinguish a page of Bossuet from a classical French translation of St Augustine. Bossuet himself tells us, "Whatever I have learned of style has come from books in Latin and a little from the Greek . . . from Cicero, chiefly from the de Oratore . . . there is nothing so essential to the mastery of style as complete understanding of the subject treated and the possession of wide knowledge. Cicero requires of his orator *multarum rerum scientiam.*"

While Bossuet was preaching in France, the Royal Society in England drew up their rules and resolved upon a prose style which should "separate the knowledge of Nature from the colours of Rhetorick, the devices of Fancy, or the delightful deceit of Fables". They determined upon a prose which would reject all "amplifications, digressions and swellings of style; to return back to the primitive purity and shortness when men delivered so many things almost in an equal number of words. They have exacted from all their members a close, naked, natural way of speaking, positive expressions, clear senses, a native easiness, bringing all things as near the Mathematical plainness as they can, and preferring the language of Artizans, Countrymen and Merchants, before that of Wits or Scholars" (Sprat, *History of the Royal Society*, London, 1667, Pt. II, p. 58).

Bossuet was already preaching in this way and found himself less popular than some more florid performers. But neither he nor the Royal Society (whose own pronouncement could do with a little pruning) were entirely free from the fallacious notion fostered by the baleful influence of M. Descartes, that there was an essential simplicity about things, once a few radical operations of tidying up had been completed by the best people. We, alas! know that the

truth is very different; that men, and the universe in which they are set, are infinitely more mysterious than they ever dreamed; and that much of the simplicity we think to find in things has too often been imported by the beholder; and that we ourselves impose upon the tangle of fact the schema of sensibility.

Rightly was he called the eagle of Meaux and his best-loved work by the untranslatable title *Elevations sur les Mystères*. For part of his greatness springs from his acceptance of the responsibility of the preacher, who must, like the eagle of tradition, mount up with wings and bring into focus and mutual relation as much as possible in a moment of time. His true greatness springs from his awareness that for the true view even the eagle of Meaux must be upborne by a power not his own.

Our own tradition of preaching has become so dominated by a narrow interpretation of the pastoral concern that even the visiting bishop feels that he must outdo the local pastor in friendly topicality. But there is this other style in Christian preaching which few can attempt and for which in present times few opportunities are offered. It is the true grand manner—a style which expresses the most highly generalized facts in language of disarming simplicity and all with an easy and unobvious organization which enables the hearer not only to grasp the whole in a moment but to possess it for ever. Those who heard William Temple deliver the famous Mission to the University at Oxford in 1931 will recognize the matter and the manner.

It is a style which cannot be acquired directly. For it is the outcome of a wide and deep reading based on the wisdom of the past as it is open for us in Scripture and Christian tradition; and from a sparking of this with a sympathetic attention to the particular and the contemporary. Yet this attention must be detached even where it is most sympathetic; for otherwise it loses much in authoritative weight if it becomes too identified with contemporary enthusiasms. We should look therefore, if we would follow Bossuet, for a kind of asceticism of the intellect which strives so hard for the fulfilment of prophetic responsibility that it can give itself only with the greatest difficulty to contemporary expressions of the eternal form of truth and yet is saved by its historic sense from becoming lost in mere generalities. This authentic "detachment in engagement" is easily distinguished from its counterfeits—the cynicism which despises everything and the despair which hopes for nothing. It is a rare gift, and if too many think they have it they are deceived. But some should have it and not enough have.

It is sometimes suggested that all preaching of the past, when the problem of faith is alleged to have been in no way acute, is irrelevant to the modern pulpit. Only those who are quite ignorant of the mood of the seventeenth century could make such a suggestion.

Consider a famous sermon of Bossuet for Anne of Gonzaga. Here was an extraordinary woman who, spending her early years in the cloister, took one look outside and, feeling she had not been told the truth about things, proceeded to make up for the time she had

lost. She fell in love with the young Henry de Guise, himself committed like Anne to a life of celibacy by being marked out for the archbishopric of Rheims. She began to call herself, without the fiction of a marriage ceremony, Madame de Guise, and referred to "le duc mon mari". When the absurdities of this situation were revealed, she was married off against her wishes to the young Protestant Prince Edward, son of the Duke of Bavaria. At his death in 1663 she shocked even the Court by her excesses. But most significant is the fact that her moral licence was backed by the open profession of atheism and ridicule of Christian tradition. In the great account which she wrote in later life for her spiritual guide, Armand de Rancé, she confesses that she had so far lost all faith that when anyone spoke with apparent conviction about the Christian mysteries she was "unable to restrain a smile".

It was over the mortal remains of this woman that Bossuet took for text Isaiah 41. 9 and 10: "Thou whom I have taken from the ends of the earth, and called thee from the chief men thereof, and said unto thee, Thou art my servant; I have chosen thee, and not cast thee away. Fear thou not; for I am with thee. . . ." It was the consideration of these very words which had proved to be the decisive point in the conversion of Anne of Gonzaga. Bossuet reveals his extraordinary ability to extract the universal significance of a particular and personal history from his handling of this text. He was well aware of its real meaning, but used it to confront all his auditory with the question of ultimate choices, and reveals as he handles it the fundamental interrelation of moral conduct with intellectual decision. Towards the end he uses some words which sum up his own conception of the preacher's vocation: "Mon discours, dont vous vous croyez peut-être les juges, vous jugera au dernier jour . . . et, si vous n'en sortez plus chrétiens, vous en sortirez plus coupables."

Mr Gladstone, *polymathetes anglicanus*, in his early years found time to read Bossuet, and remarks, "Some of Bossuet's theology seems to me very good." Those who venture in this august company upon a similar pilgrimage will not be disappointed.

G. L. Phillips.

The Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary[1]

Why do ye not even of your own selves judge that which is right?—St Luke 12. 37.

The doctrine of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary has recently been defined by the Pope, and this has led many outside the Roman Catholic Church to ask what this doctrine means, and what attitude they ought to take towards it.

It is well to admit quite frankly that definition of the dogma of the Assumption looks very different from outside the Roman Catholic Church than it must do from within. To us it appears a

[1] A sermon preached before the University of Oxford in the Church of St Mary the Virgin on 17 November 1950.

strange, novel, and paradoxical doctrine; to Roman Catholics, for whom the festival of the Assumption has been for centuries the crown of the Marian year of festival, it can only appear to be registering doctrinally something which has long been in fact included among the credenda of a Roman Catholic, or as giving a careful definition which might appear long overdue. Fr Henry St John, for example, in the last number of *Blackfriars* admits that he has had, up to now, little enthusiasm for the definition of the doctrine precisely on the ground that everybody believed it already. The volume of enthusiastic support for the definition of the dogma published during the summer suggests much the same conclusion. There have, indeed, been distinguished and able Roman Catholics, even members of the hierarchy, who have in the recent past expressed their lack of belief in the doctrine itself, but such voices have, on the whole, been rare and since the definition will be silenced.

There is a natural tendency for a non-Roman Catholic to take the newly defined dogma as a doctrine which is primarily concerned with the Blessed Virgin Mary. Roman Catholic textbooks, however, make it plain that it is as much a corollary of the doctrine of the Incarnation as a doctrine concerned with the Blessed Virgin Mary. It is virtually upon these grounds that the doctrine is defended, for example, by Fr Henry St John.

Nor does the doctrine of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin stand alone. It represents rather the third and perhaps the final stage in a ladder of development which begins with the doctrine of the Perpetual Virginity and continues with the Immaculate Conception.

Let us be quite clear at the outset what the doctrine really involves. It is not believed by Roman Catholics that the Blessed Virgin never died at all, but was translated so "that she should see death". Some have no doubt maintained such a view in the past, but a solid authority, such as Tanquerey, explicitly states that the Assumption took place *post mortem*. Nor is a Roman Catholic committed to the acceptance of the historical truth of the apocryphal work *De Transitu Mariae* which, although ascribed at one time to the second-century Father, Melito of Sardis, was expressly condemned by a decree of Pope Gelasius. It is not surprising that Fr Bellamy, in the article in the *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, breathes a sigh of relief that a Roman Catholic is not bound to believe the historical truth or authenticity of such a document, though some would argue quite contrary to the normal practice of apocryphal documents that a kernel of historic fact might be deemed to underlie it. It is, however, maintained that the Blessed Virgin was assumed *post mortem* into Heaven not merely spiritually, but also corporeally.

The doctrine of the Assumption raises, however, many difficulties for a non-Roman Catholic.

1. Scriptural warrant is almost entirely lacking. Fr Bellamy virtually admits this conclusion. There is one passage, in Revelation 12. 1, which appears the most promising possibility, but few modern

scholars would accept with other than caution any doctrine which rested solely upon the Apocalypse. Historically it is certain that two different interpretations of the passage were offered in early Fathers as alluding either to the Virgin or to the Church, and the earliest authorities prefer the second interpretation to the first.

If, then, the doctrine of the Assumption is not to be found in Holy Scripture, it becomes a relevant question how it emerged. It is suggested by some Roman Catholic scholars that information was given to the Apostles by means of visions either individually or corporately. Appeals of this kind to a secret tradition are rarely satisfactory, and smack somewhat of the apocryphal literature. Fr St John prefers to leave such speculations on one side and to approach the problem from other standpoints. The problem is nevertheless a real one.

The failure to discover any substantial biblical warrant for the doctrine is, from the standponit of the Anglican and other non-Roman Catholic churches, a serious impediment both to belief in the truth of the doctrine and still more to the possibility of its definition. An Orthodox friend of mine whose Church appears on the whole favourable to the doctrine declared himself opposed to the definition of the doctrine on precisely this ground. It can only, in default of scriptural warrant, remain at best a pious opinion. It is not the case that Anglicans reduce theology to a parrot-like repetition of biblical texts or deny the validity of any kind of theological development, but that we insist (as the Articles maintain) that nothing may be laid down as necessary to salvation for which there is insufficient warrant in Holy Scripture.

2. Suspicion is still further aroused by the use of the argument from tradition. Even Fr Bellamy admits that the evidence is "un peu tardif", and few critical scholars would dissent from his careful and candid review of the evidence. It is agreed that there is no mention of the doctrine in the first five centuries. An alleged allusion in Pseudo-Dionysius is so obscure that it should be neglected, while the reference to a primitive tradition by St John of Damascus in the eighth century depends upon the dubious authority of Juvenal of Jerusalem. (This reference is considered more fully below.) The earliest reference to the doctrine is probably to be found in the writings of St Gregory of Tours, and the earliest allusion to a festival of the Assumption is found in connexion with the Eastern Emperor Maurice. What is whispered in the fifth century becomes a common currency in the seventh and eighth centuries. Modestus, Patriarch of Jerusalem, St Andrew of Crete, St Germanus of Constantinople, and St John of Damascus, are the chief figures in this doctrinal development which took place alike in East and West.

The early silence is, of course, differently interpreted by Roman and non-Roman Catholics. The former interpret it as tacit or implicit consent, while the latter regard it as implying a clear ignorance of the doctrine before the fifth century. Other Anglican scholars have been paying attention to the conditions of the development of doctrine, but the Anglican interpretation of this silence is confirmed

by the fact that early Fathers, who refer to the Blessed Virgin in doctrinal contexts, are extremely reserved in their interpretation of her person and work. In view of this significant fact it would, I think, be difficult to interpret silence in this case as tacit consent.

A church like our own which gives special priority to the first five centuries of Christian history, not only because of their primitive date, but also because of the essential thinking together and Catholicity of all parts of the Christian Church during this period, must inevitably look askance at a doctrine whose tentative origins fall just within this period, but whose full development stands three or four centuries outside it.

What, then, appear to be the main grounds on which Roman Catholics base their belief in this doctrine?

(*a*) The first and the weakest strand in their evidence is the argument from archaeology. Fr Bellamy calls attention to the fact that there are two traditions about the place where the Blessed Virgin died, at Ephesus or at Jerusalem. The latter tradition is supported by the story recorded by St John of Damascus four centuries later, that in 432 the Byzantine Emperor Marcian, with his wife Pulcheria, demanded from Juvenal, Bishop of Jerusalem, relics of the Blessed Virgin for onward transmission to the upstart junior see of the Eastern capital. Juvenal replied that the tomb of the Blessed Virgin was a cenotaph. Later even this cenotaph was taken to Constantinople for the greater glory of the imperial see. But the tradition here is decidedly suspect. The location of sacred sites in the Holy Land was then, as now, determined by a curious blend of piety and archaeology. Juvenal, as St Leo his contemporary noted, was an unsatisfactory person, and his reply might well be the only way of preventing some of the sacred relics of Jerusalem from passing from the Holy City. The motive behind his denial seems all too obvious. A fifth-century controversial tradition emanating from Jerusalem that the tomb of the Blessed Virgin there was a cenotaph seems, at best, very precarious evidence on which to base a definable dogma like the Assumption.

(*b*) The second strand in the evidence is the witness of the *lex orandi*. The argument runs that devout Christians in both West and East have observed with great spiritual profit the festival of the Assumption from a late sixth-century date. The festival of the Assumption is the crown of the Marian year. Now, it must be admitted that the religious *lex orandi* is in general prior to the theological *lex credendi*. People prayed in a Christmas spirit before they framed the doctrine of the Incarnation. Baptism in the name of the Holy Trinity clearly antedates the Nicene formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity.

It is important however to note (unless a strangely pragmatic point of view is taken in this matter of prayer) that the practice of prayer and the use of certain matters as foci for piety do not by themselves guarantee the truth of the doctrines which have evolved from them. Granted that the doctrine of the Trinity might very well never have emerged in full clarity if people had not been baptized into the

Triune Name, what makes the doctrine of the Trinity a vital and true part of Christian doctrine is not merely this fact, but also the additional point that there is a triadic structure which, in the main, underlies the New Testament. The *lex orandi* has here a sufficient support in Holy Scripture and in tradition.

Can, then, any satisfactory basis for the devotional attitude to the Blessed Virgin Mary which lies behind the newly defined dogma be discovered from the New Testament and elsewhere? The evidence, frankly, points quite the other way. The "Hail, thou that art highly favoured", already hard pressed in the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, cannot carry us all the way there. If we examine the references to our Lord's Blessed Mother in the four Gospels, we shall find the evidence hardly congruous with the stream of thinking which has so far ended in the Assumption. On three of the four occasions on which his Mother is mentioned in connexion with our Lord, it is not to associate her with himself, but to dissociate her from himself that she is mentioned. In the Johannine narrative of the miracle of Cana in Galilee, in answer to her request, he replies "What have I to do with thee? Mine hour is not yet come." The woman in the crowd who cried out "Blessed is the womb that bare thee and the breasts which thou hast sucked" is not commended, but finds her adoring ejaculation set aside: "Yea, rather blessed are they that hear the Word of God and keep it." Again, in St Mark's Gospel, in reply to a protest from his Mother and his brethren that he was beside himself, he replies, "Who are my mother and my brethren? For whosoever shall do the will of God, the same is my brother, and sister and mother." It is only from the Cross that even a kind word comes to the Blessed Virgin from our Lord. In all affairs which concern the Kingdom and its coming, he travels alone and does not appear to associate her with himself. This consideration does little to suggest that the *lex orandi* which focuses on her is a theologically correct as well as a devotionally helpful practice.

If, then, the development of the place of the Blessed Virgin in the *lex orandi* is not a primitive one, what was the motive which led to the evolution of the cultus on which, in due time, the doctrine of the Assumption was grafted? It might perhaps be rather too radical a suggestion to call attention to the fact that the earliest trace of the cult of the Blessed Virgin is found as an apparently local practice, at Ephesus where, for centuries before, the cult of a mother goddess was prevalent. What is more to the point is that it grew up at an epoch in which the feeling for history was beginning to decline. The Incarnation was in many quarters of the Christian Church being regarded as the epiphany of the Logos in the flesh expressed in a manner which suggested the lack of any independent valuation of our Lord's humanity. It is not suggested that every Father who described the Blessed Virgin as the Theotokos was an Apollinarian or, worse, a Eutychian, but that the movement which led in excess to Apollinarius and Eutyches also threw the weight of its incarnational thinking upon the divinity of our Lord, and enshrined its convictions in the particular attitude to and description of the Blessed Virgin.

(*c*) The third approach to the doctrine of the Assumption is the argument from theological congruity. The recent article by Fr Henry St John is, for example, almost wholly devoted to this aspect of the problem. The doctrine appears rather as a corollary of the Incarnation. In the classical Roman Catholic textbooks the doctrine of the Blessed Virgin occurs as a pendant to the doctrine of her Son. The history of this corollary may be briefly traced. St Paul described our Lord as the Second Adam, and second-century Fathers like St Irenaeus and Tertullian carry this further by tracing an analogy between the Virgin Mary and the Virgin Eve. It is however worth noting in passing that a careful distinction (as well as a general parallelism) is drawn between our Lord and his Mother as well. Such caution helps us to interpret the silence of these centuries with regard to the doctrine of the Assumption as a silence of ignorance, and not of assent. Fr St John notices three stages in the evolution of the doctrine of the Blessed Virgin. First emerges belief in her Perpetual Virginity on which, as he admits, the New Testament evidence is at least ambiguous. Next follows the doctrine of her Immaculate Conception, which she probably did not know herself, and on which the Apostles are certainly silent. Finally comes the doctrine of the Assumption, which is the third stage of doctrinal evolution. At each stage Fr St John urges the parallels between our Lord and his Mother, between her Perpetual Virginity and his Virgin Birth, between his Immaculate Conception and his positive sinlessness, and between her Assumption and his Resurrection and Ascension. It was fitting, so this argument runs, that the One through whom our Lord received his incorruptible flesh should herself attain to an accelerated incorruptibility.

Now, it is one thing for a general parallel to be drawn between our Lord and Adam, and the Blessed Virgin and the Virgin Eve, and quite another thing for an inference to be made from the saving pattern of our Lord's life and teaching to other matters of fact connected with his Mother, for which there is, on the admisison of Fr St John, no particle of scriptural evidence. An inference, even more a meditated inference, cannot be allowed to act as a substitute for a complete lack of New Testament evidence. We believe in the Virgin Birth of our Lord, in his positive sinlessness and his Resurrection and Ascension, because of New Testament evidence which we hold to be sufficient; we are asked to believe in the correspondences in the life of the Blessed Virgin for no other reason than that they are correspondences. Analogy is no substitute for evidence. The doctrine of the Incarnation emerged as a series of inferential steps taken theologically from adequate historical evidence; the three doctrines about the Blessed Virgin to which Fr St John calls attention proceed without historical evidence by a series of inferences which carry us progressively further from New Testament principles and insights.

Fr St John makes much of the doctrine of the Blessed Virgin considered as an implicate of the Incarnation, and thence proceeds to argue that, in view of the widespread declension in many quarters from the fact of the Incarnation and the principles which flow from

it, the Roman Catholic Church does well to throw out, as it were, a buttress of faith. The definition has been described as an act of faith in a faithless age. It is certainly arguable that such a buttress is a sign rather of weakness than of strength. The interests of faith do not appear to be well served by an insistence upon the overtones of faith and the extension of defined and definable dogma into areas better suited for the exercise of pious opinion. At least it cannot be argued as a logical corollary that those who refuse to take such steps thereby proclaim a weakened hold on the faith of the Incarnation. The Gospels do not single out for special commendation those who bind upon men's shoulders burdens heavy to bear. To conjoin too closely in dogma our Lord with the One whom he dissociated rather from himself in the days of his flesh may well appear a curious way of protecting the Incarnation of our Lord.

It is finally alleged in some quarters that the inevitable alternative to not accepting the Roman Catholic doctrine of the Blessed Virgin is to have no doctrine at all. That is not true so far as the Church of England is concerned. John Cosin, Bishop of Durham, one of the revisers of the Prayer Book of 1662, while calling attention to the dignity and number of the festivals of the Blessed Virgin Mary retained in the English Prayer Book, expressly gives as the reason for the exclusion of the Assumption the fact that the only evidence in its support came from an apocryphal source. Bishop John Pearson, in his classical commentary on the Apostles' Creed, wrote as follows: "We cannot bear too reverent a regard unto the Mother of our Lord so long as we give her not that worship which is due unto the Lord himself. Let us keep the language of the primitive Church. Let her be honoured and esteemed, let him be worshipped and adored." George Hickes, the non-juror, after a paragraph in which he sets out clearly the honour which is her due, continues: "But we must not let our respect for her commence into worship, nor romance her into a deity, because it was her lot to be that happy Virgin of whom Christ was born. We must not treat her upon the account of her singular relation to Immanuel as if she were an Infinite Majesty or as if her graces were Divine attributes and her prerogatives of grace and glory, as a late book asserts, one and the same with those of her Son. We ought not to pay such homage and veneration to her under the character of Queen as is only due to the King of Heaven. Let us imitate her blessed example and thank God for the benefit of it. Let us endeavour as she did to hear the Word of God and keep it, and to do the Will of our Heavenly Father, then shall we all become as she, highly favoured, even the Mother and the Sister and Brethren of Christ."

H. E. W. Turner.

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CORRESPONDENCE

THE DAUGHTER OF ZION

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

Your correspondent in the last issue attacked the two key-points, namely the word "Rejoice" at the Annunciation, and Mary's Magnificat, where the "Daughter of Zion" thesis seems to me really cogent; if these stand, then the other suggested points, which taken by themselves would not be cogent at all, become probable—if, that is to say, the evangelist really was thinking along these lines. (A further point has been suggested to me by Dr Sahlin in a recent letter: the widow of Nain in Luke 7 is so similar to the widow woman in 2 Esdras 9 and 10 that this incident also may have been to St Luke a symbol of our Lord's mission to Israel.) But as regards the two points: to treat the words of the angelic salutation as "a piece of fine writing inserted for stylistic reasons" is unjust to St Luke, who was far more sensitive to biblical themes than he was supposed to be by the scholars of the last generation. And as for 1. 46, I think with Creed that St Luke wrote, "And she said . . .", but that he assumed that everyone would understand the subject to be "Mary". For throughout Luke 1 and 2 there is a parallel between Zachariah the father and Mary the mother; in either case there is an annunciation, a description of the mission of the promised Child, a trial of faith, a sign, the story of the birth, and a canticle. Further, the words of the *Magnificat* (e.g. "all generations shall call me blessed") are far too comprehensive to be applicable to the mother of the Forerunner.

A. G. HEBERT, S.S.M.

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"THE WORK AND WORDS OF JESUS"

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

I should like to comment on a few points made by Mr C. F. Evans of Oxford in his review of my book *The Work and Words of Jesus* which appeared in your November number. They appear to me to be both captious and unfair.

First, he objects to my making "some hundred and fifty quotations from modern writers in a hundred and fifty pages of text". In

a book of this kind which seeks to present the views of modern scholars frequent quotation is to be expected; but Mr Evans's figure is a gross exaggeration.

Second, Mr Evans says that I have "adopted the Markan outline of the Ministry almost without question". I have not. In a short book long discussion is impossible; but on pp. 42 f. I have faced the question and pointed my readers to C. H. Dodd's "anti-K. L. Schmidt" article on the subject. Dodd's findings underlie my reconstruction of the Ministry.

Third, Mr Evans says: "References to a future Kingdom are interpreted in terms of the Resurrection or Pentecost or the World Church." The passages to which he refers are my discussions of Mark 9. 1 and Matt. 6. 10. If I am wrong in my view of the first of these passages, I am wrong in the excellent company of H. B. Swete, William Sanday, and C. H. Dodd. In the second case, I suggest that the parable of the Mustard Seed (a parable of growth whose meaning seems to me: "Small beginnings, great endings") is Jesus' parabolic and pictorial exegesis of "Thy kingdom come", and hint that he has the growth of a community in view. I am prepared to stand by that explanation and refer Mr Evans to Newton Flew: *Jesus and His Church*, 36–39.

Fourth, I am criticized for claiming the First Beatitude (Lukan version), "Blessed are ye poor, for yours is the kingdom of God", in support of a doctrine of realized eschatology. If Mr Evans will consult his *Huck*, he will see that in the three cases where the Kingdom occurs in the beatitudes (two Matthaean and one Lukan) the present tense occurs in all three. There is no beatitude which says "Yours *will* be the kingdom of God".

Fifth, I am taken to task for the statement that to deny that Jesus identified himself with the Suffering Servant is "the merest scepticism". I stand by that assertion, and at my back I have Rudolf Otto, William Manson, and Vincent Taylor.

Sixth, I am criticized for affirming that there is "a textual problem" in the Lukan account of the Last Supper. There is. I wish I could solve it satisfactorily. So does Mr Evans. Or has he?

Seventh, I am criticized because I have "practically ignored" the Form Critics and, in particular, because (though I have quoted too much already) I have not quoted from Bultmann, Dibelius, and R. H. Lightfoot. Here I must first point out that I have treated Form Criticism in my first chapter. In the second place, I have my own opinion of the value of Form Criticism, an opinion which, if it is not shared by Mr Evans, is shared by a good many scholars in this country. (See, for example, Professor Donald Baillie's pages in his *God was in Christ*.) Nor am I clear why I *must* quote the findings of men who believe that the Gospels "yield us little more than a whisper of Christ's voice" (Lightfoot) or that "we can know almost next to nothing concerning the life and personality of Jesus" (Bultmann). Such conclusions stultify criticism in the eyes of ordinary men.

Eighth, Mr Evans elects to compare my book with Hoskyns's *Riddle*

of the New Testament. He must know that I did not set out to do what Hoskyns so admirably did. The comparison is not in *pari materia*, and is introduced only in order to disparage my book.

Ninth, the final cavil is that I should not have tried to write the book at all. The time is not ripe. Yet Mr Evans says that I have used "the synthetic method", and we have the high authority of Professor Dodd for saying that the present task of New Testament studies is just this one of synthesis. Furthermore, I observe that Mr Evans himself did not refuse to contribute to a recent *Word Book* of the Bible whose aim (in its editor's words) is to "present a cross-section of representative English-speaking biblical scholarship at the middle of the twentieth century". Yet I supposed that I was doing just that for the Life of Christ!

Yours truly,

12, Westfield Terrace,
Aberdeen.

A. M. Hunter.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Church of England in the Twentieth Century. Volume II: 1919–39. By Roger Lloyd. Longmans. 18s. 6d.

The second and concluding volume of Canon Lloyd's survey of the contemporary history of the Church of England has all the engaging and attractive qualities of its predecessor. It is arresting, informative, and never dull. The author writes with "enthusiasm", insight, and verve; and in attempting the formidable task of writing contemporary history, he has achieved a considerable degree of success within his self-chosen limits. For, as in his former volume, he confesses that his objective is not to write a history of the Church of England in the usually accepted sense of the term, but to develop a *mystique*. His readers therefore have to judge whether his chosen limits and method give a resultant picture which may be said to be fairly representative of the contemporary Church, or whether what is offered is a picture so incomplete as to be at times distorted. But full recognition must be given to the boldness, enterprise, and interest, of the volume.

Canon Lloyd has cast his net widely; and at times the reader may be surprised and challenged by his verdicts. Thus, for example, he pays a warm tribute to the Bible Reading Fellowship as probably "the most successful and effective" agent for combating the ignorance of the Scriptures amongst English people, which is an agreed and lamented characteristic of the age. In his account of the Church and the social conscience he is at his best. In particular his narrative of the experiments in housing made at St Pancras by Basil Jellicoe and in Leeds by Charles Jenkinson (which latter section benefited greatly from the comments and corrections of Jenkinson before his premature death) constitutes a moving and notable contribution to the

history of our times. Equally interesting are his detailed examples of effective parochial ministries both in town and country, especially of the Church on Tyneside. All Anglicans should read these chapters for their consolation and inspiration. Similarly there is much for information and guidance in his survey of the problem of ordinands in all its aspects, in his enthusiasm for bringing the cathedrals to the people and the people to the cathedrals, and in his concluding account of the missionary movement within the Church. His readers will be grateful for these reminders and examples of what our Church has done in circumstances of unusual and increasing difficulty.

It is true that sometimes Canon Lloyd is carried away by his enthusiasms. Thus, in his zeal for the worship and witness of cathedrals he is ready to throw overboard completely the historical tradition that they should be centres of sacred learning, which office for the future he relegates to monasteries only (p. 237). This is to fly in the face of the history and constitutional title-deeds of cathedrals. In his zeal for the Parish Communion he is apt to make it the chief, if not sole, test of parochial effectiveness; no shadow of dubiety crosses his mind as to some of the pastoral problems which attend it; and in his enthusiasm he gives us a detailed description of the parish eucharist in Newcastle Cathedral, even down to the servers moving "to and fro across the rose-pink of the altar frontal". Whatever Canon Lloyd approves, appears in *couleur de rose*. His warm championship of baptismal reform obscures the fact that its protagonists have accepted the Puritan standpoint against the traditional Catholic view of baptism (and this in the centenary year of the Gorham decision!), and have overthrown the explicit Anglican order of Canon 68 of the Canons of 1604.

Of course the author has his dislikes also; and his chief bête-noire is Anglican modernism, to which he administers the most scathing condemnation. The vehemence (if not the sobriety) of his judgment may be gathered from two censures: "It is to the rule of the commissar that what the theologians call Theological Liberalism leads" (p. 27); and, "Once accept the religion of the Bible as true, and there is no escaping from the conclusion that Liberalism is justly described in the great anathema of the Commination Service in the Book of Common Prayer: 'Cursed be he that putteth his trust in man, and taketh man for his defence, and in his heart goeth from the Lord' " (p. 29). After this it is little surprising that Canon Lloyd can only describe the enemy, in a phrase combining a contradiction in terms and a biological miracle, as "a living corpse"! (p. 47). Nor is it surprising that his only references to the *Report on Doctrine in the Church of England* are the mention of the date of its publication, and a citation from the chairman's introduction to the Report (pp. 48 and 59). Perhaps, however, it is astonishing that his mention of Dr A. C. Headlam's "very judicious castigation" of the report of the Girton Conference of Modern Churchmen in 1921 does not embrace any quotation from the *Church Quarterly Review* of 1922 in which it appeared, but only a reference to an article in THEOLOGY of 1940.

Canon Lloyd's second volume, like his first, seems to have been written too much from secondary or tertiary sources. Thus in his account of the Malines Conversations he observes that: "Armitage Robinson, the most learned theologian among them, seems to have played but a little part. It consisted mostly of mislaying important papers at the moment when they were most needed" (p. 263). The present reviewer can only comment that his reading of *The Conversations at Malines 1921–1925: original documents edited by Lord Halifax*, published in 1930, does not bear out this conclusion. But Canon Lloyd's authorities are various biographies, and he does not refer to these original sources; whilst his only quotation from Bishop Frere's *Recollections of Malines* (1935) is by way of a citation at second-hand from Mr Lockhart's biography of Lord Halifax. Even contemporary history needs to be written from first-hand sources, so easily accessible in print.

At times and in places the author seems to depart from the principles of his own *mystique*. Thus he emphasizes that "the tie that binds" together the churches of the Anglican Communion "is the Book of Common Prayer" (p. 20); yet of the efforts of the Church of England towards revision of that Book, culminating in the Deposited Prayer Books of 1927–28, he admits that in his volume they "occupy no space at all" (p. 25). Similarly he writes that "our leaders are like the generals in a modern army—absolutely necessary for victory, but they do their leading from behind" (p. 23). *Per contra* one of his principal heroes is William Temple, whom it is not usual, to say the least, to depict as an archiepiscopal Duke of Plaza Toro! Likewise Canon Lloyd continues from his former volume his indifference to detailed accuracy. Thus he cannot get the right dates for *Essays Catholic and Critical* nor *Lux Mundi* (p. 49). In his citations from Hoskyns and Davey, *The Riddle of the New Testament*, his footnotes, with one exception, refer to Canon Charles Smyth's edition of Hoskyns's Cambridge sermons! (footnotes on pp. 53, 54, 57: "Smyth, op. cit."). Nor are these more than a handful of many which could be cited. Now all students of history are liable to the infirmities of *lapsus oculi* or *lapsus calami*; but the number and variety of Canon Lloyd's slips make it difficult to be sure that he has striven for such a degree of accuracy as human infirmity permits.

The fundamental question concerning his book, however, is whether its picture is really representative of contemporary Church life; for a historian may be so selective as to produce a distortion of the history of his period. Canon Lloyd seems to verge on this danger, both in details and in some major matters. In points of detail, for example, he refers to the theological contribution of Anglican laymen, mentioning C. S. Lewis, Dorothy Sayers, T. S. Eliot, Charles Williams, and A. E. Taylor (pp. 17, 48); and one wonders why C. C. J. Webb and Edwyn Bevan are excluded? Or, again, it is surprising not to find the name of J. K. Mozley appearing in text or index (though Mozart figures in both), since the author is concerned with important English theologians. More serious is the chapter on The Search for Christian Unity, which gives 13 pages to the Malines

Conversations, and 9 pages to the Fellowship of St Sergius and St Alban, but has no mention of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches of Europe, and dismisses the conversations with Freechurchmen in England arising from the 1920 Lambeth Conference Appeal in half a page. Here also it is stated that "Dr George Bell's *Documents on Christian Unity* deals only with the first consequences of the Lambeth Appeal during the years 1920–24" (p. 257). In point of fact a second volume dealing with the period to 1930 appeared in 1930; and a third covering the years 1930–48 appeared in 1948 (though this last volume may have been too late for Canon Lloyd to notice, since his preface is dated June 1949, but this cannot of course be true of the second of Dr Bell's volumes).

But the most remarkable example of omission amounting to distortion relates to the internal history of the Church of England. During the period between 1919 and 1939 one of the most remarkable and influential movements was that of Liberal Evangelicalism and its society, the Anglican Evangelical Group Movement. It was noteworthy as a sustained endeavour to liberate the Evangelical school of churchmanship from biblical fundamentalism; and it had a particular importance in the wider history of the Church, because so many of its leaders were raised to the episcopate. Yet this entire movement and its principals find no record whatever in *The Church of England in the Twentieth Century: Volume II, 1919–39.*

These criticisms do not detract from the positive merits and achievement of Canon Lloyd within his limits. No reader can fail to derive both instruction and edification, both pleasure and profit from the perusal of this second volume. Nor can he fail to be impressed by the verve and enthusiasm of the narrative. What is doubtful is whether a history written within such limits and compassed about with so many inaccuracies can hope to enjoy the influence which otherwise might have been its merited fortune. Canon Lloyd may be read with profit by the instructed historian who can fill in his gaps and correct his misstatements. In the hands of the uninstructed reader the perusal of his volumes is more likely to produce a partisan and propagandist picture of the contemporary Church. So much is left out that the sense of proportion is lost, and a serious danger of distortion ensues. This is a great pity, for the merits of the volume are as plain as its defects are undeniable.

CAMBRIDGE. NORMAN SYKES.

THE ROLLS AND REGISTER OF BISHOP OLIVER SUTTON, 1280–1299. Edited by Rosalind M. T. Hill. Lincoln Record Society, No. 39.

This volume of the Lincoln Record Society is notable both for its scholarly editing, so long a characteristic of the works of the Society, and for the intrinsic interest of the register itself. This book, Part I of Bishop Sutton's register in the form in which it is to be published, is an English, annotated, calendar of his institutions to benefices and confirmation of elections in the archdeaconry of Lincoln;

but in the cases where the entry of the institution of a rector or vicar differs from the normal, and of certain elections to religious houses, the full Latin text of the documents is printed. A medieval bishop's register was primarily a legal record, compiled by his registrar, and it contained a great many routine entries made according to "common form"; Miss Hill's method of editing saves space while giving names, dates and places, and makes the information accessible to those unfamiliar with medieval Latin formulas. At the same time, the specimen Latin formulas and the long transcripts of abnormal Latin entries satisfy the scholarly inquirer into medieval ecclesiastical practice.

Bishop Sutton's register is of particular interest for its early date, and for the fact that it covered the period of the change-over from a record made in the form of rolls to one in the form of quires, bound into a single volume at the bishop's death, or after the lapse of a period long enough to make the bound quires a good-sized volume. By far the greater number of surviving English episcopal registers were written in quires and bound in volumes; Bishop Sutton's register survives in the diocesan record office as a single large and splendid volume, together with six rolls, all compiled by his registrar, John de Scalby. Institutions were recorded on rolls at Lincoln, at this date, and the fact that rolls were more easily borrowed and lost than a bound register is suggested by the disappearance at Lincoln of all the original memoranda rolls, and the institution rolls for the archdeaconries of Oxford, Huntingdon, and Buckingham.

Professor Cheney's *English Bishop's Chanceries*, recently published, throws a flood of light on the period before the thirteenth century, for which no English registers have survived, and the publication of so early a register as Bishop Sutton's is valuable as further illustrating the history of episcopal chanceries. Professor Cheney's study is based on the separate, surviving *acta* of English bishops in the Norman and Angevin period, and he stresses the increasingly legal character of the scribe who wrote the bishop's letters and recorded his legal acts; and Miss Hill similarly notes Bishop Sutton's knowledge of canon law and insistence on its performance in due legal form. John de Scalby, the registrar, is described as a "clerk of the bishop" and was not apparently a Magister or graduate in law or arts: but while his work demanded some knowledge of formulas besides ability to write a professional script, his status was not that of the bishop's chancellor or official, who would at this date have been trained canonists.

The contents of this volume of the register should be useful to those interested in the early rectors and vicars of the archdeaconry of Lincoln, in the order of Sempringham, in the questions of papal provisions and licensed pluralism, in churches appropriated to monasteries and the food provided (or not provided) for the vicars and chaplains of such parishes, and in early chantries. They illustrate above all the hard work, care, and conscientiousness with which Bishop Oliver Sutton administered his diocese.

M. Deanesly.

PRISCILLA LYDIA SELLON. The Restorer after three Centuries of the Religious Life in the English Church. By Thomas Jay Williams. S.P.C.K. 20s.

Now that the mists of legend are gathering round the impressive figure of Priscilla Lydia Sellon, it is high time that a competent historian should write her life. Mr Williams is well fitted for the work. After two years devoted to research into the foundations of the first Anglican sisterhoods, he has produced an authoritative and very readable account of "Mother Lydia" and the part that she played. He writes with studied inpartiality, allowing the quietly marshalled facts to praise her as she deserves.

Priscilla Lydia Sellon was the daughter of a naval commander. In her own home she learned the art of exercising authority, for her eleven half-brothers and sisters looked naturally to her for guidance. There is no evidence that she was hoping for a larger sphere, when she read in *The Guardian* an account of desperate conditions in a certain part of Devonport, and decided to respond to the appeal for workers. With her father's consent, she put herself at the disposal of Henry Phillpots, Bishop of Exeter. Ignoring all the conventional ideas of what a young lady might or might not do, she took a room in a bad quarter of the town and began single-handed to teach rough boys and to influence fallen women.

To Dr Pusey must be given the credit of seeing Miss Sellon's practical and spiritual gifts. He advised the formation of a sisterhood, of which, of course, she was to be the Superior, "to ensure the elements of growth, organization, and stability". Growth there certainly was; of organization, perhaps too much; and stability was not achieved for a long time. Mistakes had to be made; bitter attacks from the extreme Protestant section of the English Church had to be weathered; character had to be formed and tempered. Nothing daunted Mother Lydia, even her own ill-health seems to have acted as a spur rather than as a deterrent. Who would have thought that a woman obliged to spend most of her time lying down could have established good works in half a dozen different places, and travelled frequently from one to the other, supervising and inspiring? She even visited Honolulu, where her last Foundation was made.

It is hard to say which part of this valuable book is the most fascinating. Some readers will be chiefly interested in harrowing scenes of Sisters nursing cholera and smallpox patients in England or travelling out to help Florence Nightingale among the soldiers in the Crimean war. Some readers will prize the details of convent life as it was lived a hundred years ago. Others, the glimpses of Marian Rebecca Hughes, Dr Pusey, and various famous holy men and women. Unfortunately Mother Lydia kept no Spiritual Journal, and very few of her letters remain. If we wish to learn more of her inner life, where are we to look? The Society of the Most Holy Trinity—as the community which resulted from the merging of the Devonport sisterhood with the London sisterhood of the Holy Cross, was called—still carries on her tradition of intense personal devotion to our Lord, overflowing into active works of mercy. And the

portrait which forms the frontispiece of the book is surely the picture of a saint.

AELFRIDA TILLYARD.

SHORTER NOTICES

DURHAM JURISDICTIONAL PECULIARS. By Frank Barlow. Oxford University Press. 12s. 6d.

It is impossible to study medieval church history very long without encountering peculiars—a parish or group of parishes exempt from the jurisdiction of the Ordinary. Though there is a general feeling that Bishop Randolph was incorrect in holding that peculiars were due "to the usurpations of Papacy in the worst times of its prevalence", little modern work has been done on them, and for this reason alone Dr Barlow's study of the peculiars of the great cathedral of Durham is to be welcomed. He considers in great detail the franchises of Durham, of Howdenshire, and Allertonshire, and the Lothian franchise of Coldinghamshire. The title is somewhat broader than the book, insomuch as the author is concerned almost entirely with constitutional and legal issues, saying little of other aspects of the history of the franchise. But this provides ample scope for the highly technical dissertation which throws new light on the administrative history of the greatest Benedictine house of northern England.

The inevitable lawsuits in which Durham was involved brought forth a number of charters forged to establish the monks' title to rights which they believed were theirs. To disentangle the false from the true here is no easy task, and the reviewer must leave the appropriate specialist to judge the reliability of Dr Barlow's conclusions here. The book would have been improved if the writer had kept less severely to his documents and had set his study against the general background of the times, but it is worthy of the series in which it appears.

J. C. DICKINSON.

PEMBROKE COLLEGE,
CAMBRIDGE.

THE OECUMENICAL DOCUMENTS OF THE FAITH. Edited by T. H. Bindley. Revised by F. W. Green. Methuen. 21s.

This is a thoroughly revised edition of a standard work. The additional notes that were appended to the original edition have been incorporated in the text, and recent developments in patristic studies have been taken into account. The volume is more handsomely produced than the earlier editions.

THE STATE PRAYERS AND OTHER VARIATIONS IN THE BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER. By Frank Streatfield. Mowbray. 6s.

Dr Streatfield has compared a large number of old editions of the Prayer Book, and has assembled here a considerable amount of

curious information about variations in points of detail. There are ten plates which are reproduced from books in the author's possession, mostly of the eighteenth century.

HERE I STAND. A LIFE OF MARTIN LUTHER. By Roland H. Bainton. Abingdon-Cokesbury Press. $4.75.

A popularly written and attractively printed biography of Luther, based on extensive research.

CORRECTIONS

We regret that on p. 480 of the December number the name of the editor of Baxter's *Reformed Pastor* was said to be "John T. Robinson" instead of "John T. Wilkinson".

On p. 25 of the January number, lines 23–4, for "has been restricted by its relation to the State" read "has linked the Church more firmly to the State".

BOOKS RECEIVED

(*Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.*)

ALLEN AND UNWIN: George Kaftal, *St Francis in Italian Painting* (12s. 6d.).

BLACKWELL: J. A. Chapman, *The End of Time* (3s. 6d.).

BRITISH PUBLISHING CO. (GLOUCESTER): Aelfrida Tillyard, *The Silence of God* (1s.).

BRUCE PUBLISHING COMPANY (MILWAUKEE 1, WISCONSIN): George C. Ring, S.J., *Religions of the Far East* ($6.00).

BURNS OATES AND WASHBOURNE: Aloysius Roche, *Mystery Man* (10s. 6d.).

CASSELL: Carlo Levi, *Of Fear and Freedom* (7s. 6d.).

CHURCH BOOK ROOM PRESS: Gordon Hewitt, *Lord Shaftesbury* (9d.).

DUCKWORTH: Marcus Knight, *Spiritualism, Reincarnation and Immortality* (6s.); Erik Routley, *The Church and Music* (9s.); J. W. Hunkin, *The New Testament: A Conspectus* (6s.).

INDEPENDENT PRESS: N. Micklem, *Congregationalism and Episcopacy* (1s.).

LUTHER VERLAG (WITTEN, RUHR): *Kirche und Kosmos: Orthodoxes und Evangelisches Christentum* (DM. 4.60).

LUTTERWORTH PRESS: Frank C. Laubach, *Letters by a Modern Mystic* (1s. 6d.).

MACMILLAN (NEW YORK): T. O. Wedel, *The Christianity of Main Street* ($2.00).

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS: W. R. Matthews, *The Problem of Christ in the Twentieth Century* (7s. 6d.); A. G. Hebert, *The Bible from Within* (8s. 6d.).

PICKERING AND INGLIS: H. C. Hewlett, *The Glories of our Lord* (5s.).

S.C.M. PRESS: G. Ernest Wright, *The Old Testament against its Environment* (6s.); Floyd V. Filson, *The New Testament against its Environment* (6s.).

SHEED AND WARD: E. I. Watkin, *Philosophy of Form* [Third Edition]; the First Edition was reviewed in THEOLOGY, November 1935, p. 299 (21s.); Jean Daniélou, *Advent* (8s. 6d.) [See review by C. F. Evans in THEOLOGY, September 1949, p. 358]; Ronald Knox, *The Gospel in Slow Motion* (8s. 6d.); G. R. Lamb, *Roman Road* (7s. 6d.).

SKEFFINGTON: Cedric Astle, *The Gospel in English Literature* (9s. 6d.); Percy Leonard, *The Greatness of God and the Dignity of Man* (8s. 6d.).

S.P.C.K.: Sir J. N. Comper, *Of the Christian Altar and the Buildings which Contain It* (5s.); The Archbishop of York, *Authority in Doctrine* (1s.); J. Wellington, Bishop of Shantung, *An Anthology of the Psalms* (9d.).

WESTMINSTER PRESS (U.S.A.): Hugh Thomson Kerr, *Positive Protestantism* ($2.50).

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